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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 2 
COSMETICS AND CRISIS? 
AN ENTERPRISE ZONE FOR LANARKSHIRE 
by M W Danson, Department of Economics and Management, Paisley College and 
M G Lloyd, Department of Land Economy, University of Aberdeen 
Introduction 
The announcement by British Steel of the forthcoming 
closure of its Ravenscraig steel works has generated a 
great deal of media interest and political controversy. The 
closure of Ravenscraig and the related closure of the 
plant and ore terminal at Hunterston will result in the loss 
of at least 1200 direct jobs, a number of further indirect 
job losses and knock-on effects on the industrial 
infrastructure of the local economy. In itself the imminent 
closure represents a catastrophe for the locality but it is 
important to acknowledge that it is not an isolated 
incident. It follows other industrial contractions in the 
region including Gartcosh, Linwood and Bathgate. The 
accumulated effects of the industrial restructuring, 
therefore, pose a considerable challenge to government, 
development bodies and local authorities. 
The government has responded to the announcement of 
the Ravenscraig closure and to the consequences of the 
anticipated local economic crisis by stating its intent to 
establish an enterprise zone in the area. Such a reaction 
is now an established tradition in Scotland where four 
enterprise zones have been located in areas suffering 
acute economic distress as a consequence of industrial 
restructuring. The individual circumstances of these 
designated zones were often compounded by the 
precipitous collapse of an individual firm, such as the 
Singer Sewing Machine Co. Ltd. in Clydebank and the 
British Aluminium Co. smelter at Invergordon. 
It is clear that the Ravenscraig closure throws into sharp 
relief the ongoing, but often overlooked, debate 
concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the Scottish 
economy, the nature of the industrial restructuring taking 
place and the geographical consequences within Scotland 
of this economic change. It also raises questions 
regarding the response of the government, generally 
within the context of Scotland's broader economic 
recovery, and specifically with respect to Ravenscraig. 
This paper considers whether an enterprise zone is an 
appropriate response by government to the problems in 
Lanarkshire caused by the Ravenscraig closure. To this 
end the paper briefly reviews the experience of the 
established enterprise zones in Scotland and considers the 
broader policy and institutional context into which an 
enterprise zone designation in Lanarkshire would fit. 
The Enterprise Zone Experiment 
Enterprise zones were introduced in the Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. The concept 
was established on an experimental basis for a specified 
period of ten years. Enterprise zones were intended "to 
test how far industrial and commercial activity can be 
encouraged by the removal or streamlined administration 
of certain statutory or administrative controls" 
(Department of the Environment, 1980). The initiative 
was broadly representative of the market-led approach to 
local economic renaissance on the part of the newly 
elected Conservative government. 
In practice, the enterprise zone experiment was essentially 
a property-led local economic development policy 
initiative. It emphasised the role of the land and property 
base in the designated zones as the trigger to secure 
further local economic and development activity. This 
was to be achieved in a number of ways, including the 
packaging of available land into viable units for 
development; the creation of a simplified planning regime 
to remove or minimise the perceived delays and 
uncertainties for property developers; the upgrading of 
land damaged by earlier industrial use; the provision of 
infrastructure and other supporting services; and, the 
provision of a range of financial and administrative 
incentives to encourage investment in commercial and 
industrial property. The incentives designed to secure an 
attractive supply of land in the designated areas included 
a simplified planning regime, tax incentives and relief to 
encourage investment in commercial and industrial 
property, rates exemptions to encourage the occupation of 
the property established and streamlined administrative 
arrangements (Danson and Lloyd, 1992). 
From Economic Planning to Crisis Management 
Following the legislation, the government initiated two 
distinct rounds of enterprise zone designation. These took 
place in 1981 and 1984. In addition in a relatively limited 
number of instances the government has employed the 
enterprise zone measure in a more ad hoc manner or 
'unplanned' way and as a form of local crisis 
management. It is in the latter category or use of the 
enterprise zone measure that the proposed designation in 
Lanarkshire falls. There is an important difference in the 
nature of the designations. 
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On the one hand, the evidence would suggest that the 
bulk of the enterprise zones made in the two formal 
rounds of designations were employed by the government 
in a relatively systematic manner. Initially enterprise 
zones were designated in areas of economic and 
industrial distress - and the designation was undertaken 
in a relatively programmed way. Thus the enterprise zone 
designations weTe targeted on specific geographical areas 
of particular economic decline and physical decay. The 
first round of enterprise zone designations in 1981, for 
example, were composed in large part of vacant and 
under-used land, often the result of earlier industrial or 
commercial activity. This phase of designations included 
the enterprise zone in Clydebank which followed the 
continuing local effects of industrial restructuring and the 
precipitate closure of the Singer Sewing Machine Co. The 
enterprise zone built on the setting up in 1980 of a SDA 
Task Force to initiate industrial promotion, factory 
building, environmental improvement and the provision 
of advice to small business (Jordan and Reilly, 1982). In 
other words, the designation formed part of an established 
'planned' response to the difficulties of the locality. 
This general approach was confirmed in the second round 
of enterprise zones in 1984. These appeared to be 
targeted on areas in an equally programmed manner, 
although the individual zones comprised land of relatively 
superior quality, including established industrial estates 
and greenfield sites. The Tayside enterprise zone, for 
example, formed part of the second phase of 
designations. This was based on a number of individual 
sites in Dundee and Arbroath. The local economy had 
experienced endemic industrial restructuring and decline 
throughout the post war period. The Dundee Project, 
established in the late 1970s by the SDA, was intended 
to promote Dundee as a location for high technology 
based industrial activity and provided the context to the 
subsequent enterprise zone designation. 
Cm the other hand, the government have also designated 
enterprise zones outwith these formal rounds. Indeed, the 
use of enterprise status in this 'one-off fashion occurred 
relatively early on, immediately prior to the formal 
designations in 1984. The Invergordon enterprise zone 
would appear to have been made for the purposes of 
crisis management as a consequence of rapidly 
deteriorating economic circumstances exacerbated by a 
high political profile. An aspect of the HIDB's early 
industrial development strategy was to attract large scale 
capital intensive enterprises to the region which would be 
located in key growth centres. Invergordon was the 
preferred location for an aluminium smelter operated by 
the British Aluminium Co. The smelter commenced 
production in 1971. In December 1981 the aluminium 
smelter closed due to deteriorating conditions in world 
commodity markets. There was an immediate loss of 
some 890 jobs, which represented 10% of local 
employment with the result that unemployment reached 
24%. There was a further multiplier effect on local firms 
supplying the smelter. The effects created a local crisis in 
the area and the Secretary of State responded by 
establishing 'a study for recovery' by the Scottish Office 
and the HIDB. This recommended action in the form of 
additional regional assistance to the area and the 
provision of further incentives to create a de facto 
enterprise zone. As a consequence of these 
recommendations and the political sensitivity of the crisis, 
the Invergordon enterprise zone was granted formal status 
in the summer of 1982. 
The crisis management aspect of the experiment was 
confirmed with the subsequent enterprise zone 
designation in 1989 in Inverclyde, which forms part of 
die Port Glasgow-Greenock-Gourock area of the regional 
economy. Up to the mid 1980s, the local economy was 
subject to a marked decline in the traditional industrial 
sectors of shipbuilding, marine engineering and associated 
port-related activities with some limited inward 
investment associated primarily with high technology and 
electronics. In 1985, the SDA in partnership with 
Strathclyde Regional Council and Inverclyde District 
Council established the Inverclyde Initiative. This had the 
stated objectives of diversifying the local industrial base, 
initiating training programmes in the local area and 
developing new business enterprises. The continued 
deterioration in the local economy prompted the need for 
action on the part of central government (Lloyd and 
Danson, 1991). 
A Qualified Success? 
In 1986, a Department of the Environment evaluation of 
the enterprise zone experiment concluded that, in addition 
to creating jobs and firm related benefits, the enterprise 
zone designation had encouraged the development of new 
premises in the zones (Department of the Environment, 
1987). In addition enterprise zones had involved the 
removal of physical dereliction and secured the physical 
improvement of the environment in the designated areas. 
This general observation must be placed in context, 
however, as what was conceived of as an economic 
experiment in private sector led regeneration actually 
comprised in practice significant inputs of public sector 
effort and spending. In terms of the costs of the 
enterprise zone experiment, for example, over the period 
1981 to 1988, public sector expenditure was £472 million 
(at 1987-1988 prices). In addition, the estimated public 
sector land acquisition costs were £41 million and public 
sector infrastructure investment was £188 million 
(Department of the Environment, 1987). For the purposes 
of this paper, however, we may draw attention to two 
further qualifications. 
Firstly, there is a marked geographical distribution to the 
achievements of the enterprise zone experiment in 
Britain. The three main Scottish zones, for example, have 
captured only a small proportion of the overall activity 
created in or attracted to the zones. Secondly, this 
geographical bias is reflected at a more local or 
sub-regional level. Within Scotland, there is a marked 
concentration in the Clydebank designation. Thus, with 
respect to employment, for example, 8.5% of total 
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TABLE 1 PROGRESS IN SCOTTISH ENTERPRISE ZONES SINCE DESIGNATION 
Developed land 
Establishments 
Floorspace ('000 sq.m. 
Employment 
% Change since Designation 
Clydebank 
41 
31 
7 
105 
T ay side 
34 
359 
151 
266 
Invergordon 
79 
400 
483 
483 
Source: Department of the Environment, 1990, 
employment is located in Scotland, with the greater bulk 
of those jobs in the Clydebank zone. With respect to the 
numbers of establishments in the enterprise zones, some 
9% of the total is located in Scotland. Again, the greatest 
concentration is in Clydebank. That is not to imply that 
the Tayside and Invergordon zones have not attracted 
jobs and firms (Danson and Lloyd, 1992). A summary, in 
percentage terms, of the changes in the post designation 
period in the Scottish enterprise zones is presented in 
Table 1. 
On the basis of the available evidence it is possible to 
assert that the individual Scottish enterprise zones have 
experienced a turning round of their respective local 
economies in terms of attracting firms, employment and 
physical regeneration. The key point, of course, is that 
the effects of the enterprise zone measures have been 
relatively modest and, furthermore, are largely localised. 
Whilst the Scottish enterprise zones have experienced 
some positive economic recovery in terms of jobs, firms 
and an increase in floorspace available, these changes 
must be put into context. These trends have been fairly 
universal outwith the major cities since the recession of 
the early 1980's. By extension, these changes have been 
strongest where the local economy had collapsed after the 
closure of major, dominant employers. For example, 
despite their designation as enterprise zones, Inverclyde 
(12.1%) and Clydebank (12.1%) still had the third equal 
highest unemployment rates in Strathclyde in late 1990. 
Furthermore, there are important distributional 
considerations to take into account. The localised effects 
of the enterprise zone experiment have included a 
redistribution of activity, usually in short distance or short 
term moves into the designated areas. Such displacement 
of employment and companies in this way clearly erodes 
the overall contribution of an enterprise zone in its 
sub-regional economic context. Further, the poor supply 
of factory and office premises in the regions in which the 
enterprise zones are located has also tended to exaggerate 
the impact of the property developments and of the 
'boundary - hopping' moves by firms, and thus the 
benefits of the provision of commercial and industrial 
space in the designated zones. 
A further irony is that the enterprise zone experiment to 
date has only worked through the underpinning of local 
land, labour and capital markets by massive public sector 
interventions - the issues associated with the Ravenscraig 
plant itself. A key element in the enterprise zone 
experiment to date has been the presence of extensive 
public sector intervention through its role as landowner, 
provider of infrastructure and supporting services, planner 
and provider of financial resources and incentives. To a 
large extent the formation of new companies and job 
creation has been through the concentrated and 
co-ordinated efforts of local and central government 
agencies: the (then) HIDB and SDA, Training Agency, 
Regional and District Councils, working through Task 
Forces, Initiatives and Agreements, with the private 
sector gaining the benefits of land, labour and capital 
assistance and subsidies. Yet the critical role of the public 
sector in the apparently privale sector economic 
experiment has not been fully acknowledged or asserted. 
The Appropriateness of a Lanarkshire Enterprise 
Zone? 
The evidence of the achievements of the existing Scottish 
enterprise zones shows that the measure is ambiguous in 
its impact on given localities. The implications therefore 
of a Lanarkshire enterprise zone may be identified as 
follows. 
On the positive side, an enterprise zone designation 
would provide an additional layer of incentives, although 
it is important that this be integrated and managed within 
any established development framework for local 
economic regeneration. This point is discussed in further 
detail below. A designation would also represent an 
acknowledgement by government of the economic 
difficulties of the area and therefore a designation may 
contribute to the morale of Lanarkshire. The evidence 
would also suggest that some economic activity will take 
place in the designated enterprise zone. 
On the negative side, however, the evidence suggests that 
there would be a significant displacement effect within 
Lanarkshire and the wider sub-region. Established firms 
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and jobs may simply relocate so as to realise the financial 
and other incentives available in the zone. This would 
simply weaken other parts of the sub-regional economy 
and erode any overall regeneration strategy. There is also 
the possibility that the designation may conflict with 
established initiatives in the area. An example would be 
the Monklands Simplified Planning Zone, which provides 
a simplified planning regime as an inducement to 
developers but not the financial incentives associated with 
enterprise zone status. 
An Economic Development Framework? 
In order to accommodate any costs associated with a 
Lanarkshire enterprise zone it is necessary to integrate the 
designation within a broader development framework. 
This would ensure the enterprise zone designation is not 
used in isolation from the established instruments and 
agents which could be mobilised in a systematic manner 
to address the problems of the Lanarkshire sub-region. 
These include bodies such as Locate in Scotland, Scottish 
Enterprise, the Lanarkshire Development Agency and the 
local authorities together with policy instruments such as 
the National Planning Guidelines (and their forthcoming 
replacement - the National Planning Policy Guidelines). 
The significant characteristic of these institutions and 
mechanisms is that they are capable of operating in an 
integrated manner and would establish an enterprise zone 
within a wider economic development context. 
Locate in Scotland (LIS) has the capacity to target 
Lanarkshire for inward investment. It is an established 
mechanism for attracting and channelling inward 
investment into Scotland. Furthermore, with respect to 
high technology development LIS has demonstrated its 
ability to liaise with planning authorities to translate the 
technology/industrial policy into land development in 
specific sites. The National Planning Guidelines are 
published by the Scottish Office Environment Department 
and have the principal purpose of identifying land 
resources which should either be safeguarded from or for 
development. The National Planning Guidelines on 'High 
Technology: Individual High Amenity Sites' identified 
four categories of sites for high technology industry. The 
category of large single-user high amenity sites is of 
particular interest as it included sites relevant to the 
Lanarkshire economy, notably Newhouse and Hunterston 
(Scottish Development Department, 1985). This site 
specific advice is also continued in the draft National 
Planning Policy Guidance "Land for Business and 
Industry" issued in October 1991 which replaces the 
National Planning Guidelines (Scottish Office 
Environment Department, 1991). 
Running parallel to these arrangements is Scottish 
Enterprise which was launched with such fanfare and 
expectation in April 1991 (Danson et al, 1990). The 
Ravenscraig crisis effectively provides the new body with 
its first real challenge, particularly as it combines training 
needs with economic development and enterprise. These 
requirements fit the objectives of Scottish Enterprise 
perfectly. Furthermore, the Lanarkshire Development 
Agency (the relevant Local Enterprise Company) is in a 
position to co-ordinate a host of bodies in the area all of 
which have a vested interest in economic recovery and 
development. These include, for example, the districts 
councils of Clydesdale, East Kilbride, Hamilton, 
Monklands and Motherwell; Strathclyde Regional 
Council; East Kilbride Development Corporation and a 
number of enterprise trusts. These bodies are already 
addressing the localised and accumulated effects of 
industrial restructuring. Furthermore, the LEC has 
identified a critical deficiency in the local infrastructure, 
namely a shortage of marketable industrial sites and 
buildings and an over-abundance of vacant and derelict 
land (Danson, Lloyd and Newlands, 1991). This again 
provides a wider strategic management context within 
which the enterprise zone designation could fit. 
Nevertheless, despite this interlocking and multi-layered 
network of complementary agencies, authorities, 
institutions and mechanisms, which jointly pioneered a 
recovery strategy for Lanarkshire through the Secretary 
of State's own 'Task Force' in 1991, the government has 
still chosen to Teact to the announced closure with a 
cosmetic crisis management exercise. 
Conclusions 
An enterprise zone is principally a means of facilitating 
the crisis management of localities experiencing 
concentrated economic catastrophe and industrial 
collapse. Furthermore such areas also assume a high 
political profile. It follows, therefore, that enterprise 
zones are not principally concerned with the planned 
strategic regeneration of the Scottish economy. Thus, an 
enterprise zone designation alone is not appropriate for 
the circumstances of the Lanarkshire economy. There are, 
however, a number of bodies and policy instruments 
which could establish a strategic and planned context to 
the managed regeneration of the Lanarkshire economy. 
Such a managed approach would also represent a vote of 
confidence in established Scottish institutions and offset 
any criticism that an enterprise zone has been imposed on 
the region from Westminster with little understanding or 
appreciation of the nature and extent of the local 
difficulties. Thus, we would question the appropriateness 
of an enterprise zone in isolation from an integrated 
economic and land use strategy for Lanarkshire. 
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